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Water quality trading has had mixed success in the United States. Despite the 
theoretical promise of water quality markets, substantial financial and technological 
support by the US EPA, and more than 48 established and pilot programs, “only 100 
facilities have participated in trading” (US EPA 2008, E-S 1).  Moreover, 80 of these 100 
trades have occurred in a single market, the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange 
program, which operates more like an exceedence tax-abatement subsidy than a market 
with endogenously determined prices.  In the Long Island Sound program annual 
allowance prices are exogenously established by a Nitrogen Credit Exchange (NCE) 
which buys and sells credits at this price and absorbs imbalances between supply and 
demand: over the first six years of the program, annual purchases of credits by NCE 
ranged from a deficit of -$3,087,018 to a surplus $1,440,100 (Nitrogen Credit Advisory 
Board, 2008). For the more “typical” watershed trading programs without such a 
generous credit exchange to absorb imbalances between supply and demand, reallocation 
of abatement levels across firms by buying and selling pollution allowances or credits has 
been much more limited (see King and Kuch, 2003; Breetz et al. (no date); and US EPA, 
2008 for discussions).  
 
In this paper we argue that the lack of widespread success in existing water quality 
trading programs may be attributed, in part, to a limited correspondence between the 
institutional and hydrologic circumstances in “typical” watersheds and the open-market 
trading system envisioned in standard economics presentations of pollution trading.  
Heeding the admonition made by Hoag and Hughes-Popp (1997), translating theory into 
practice may necessitate a reexamination of “the main principles associated with water 
pollution credit trading theory…to identify factors that influence program feasibility” (p. 
253). If such efforts are undertaken, King (2005) maintains that, “the potential for [water 
quality] trading might be realized.  If not [water quality] trading will probably end up in 
the overflowing dustbin of well-intentioned economic policies that attracted attention for 
a while but never delivered.” (p. 75) 
 
We explore two aspects of the disparity between the theory and practice of water 
quality trading programs using empirical modeling results from a case study of the Non-
Tidal Passaic River Basin phosphorus emissions trading program. First, recognizing that 
hydrological systems and Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) objectives for a particular   2
watershed may be quite complex, we broadly  interpret the Hung and Shaw (2005) 
Trading Ratio System (TRS) to enable firms to trade allowances upstream and across 
tributaries within a specified multi-zone management area.  Hung and Shaw show that the 
TRS can cost effectively meet water quality requirements at all points in a watershed 
through trades that reallocate permits from upstream to downstream sources. Whereas in 
a pure TRS-based zonal system the exchange rate between firms within a zone is one 
(i.e., a unit of emissions from one source has the same effect on downstream water 
quality as other sources within the zone), “other ratios potentially could provide policy 
makers with an additional degree of freedom” (Tietenberg, 2006).  We investigate this 
possibility by modeling a “Management Area” (MA) policy proposed for the Upper-
Passaic River Basin TMDL (Obrupta, Niazi, and Kardos, 2008).  The MA approach is 
motivated by the fact that TMDL regulations are often oriented toward avoiding critical 
“hot spots” (i.e., localized areas with unacceptably high degraded water quality due to 
high concentrations of a pollutant).  MAs group pollution sources with a common 
endpoint at one of these hot spots, and may or may not have trading ratios equal to unity 
between sources.  Within a MA bidirectional trades are allowed. Trading between MAs is 
consistent with the TRS wherein only downstream sales of allowances are permitted. 
 
Second we raise the practical concern that the canonical theoretical presentation of 
tradable pollution allowances, in which firms buy and sell pollution allowances based on 
marginal abatement costs relative to the market determined price, is inappropriate for 
cost-effectively meeting a TMDL in a typical watershed.  Such open-market exchange 
programs have been effective in settings, such as the U.S. Acid Rain Trading program 
that are characterized by large numbers of potential traders with heterogeneous abatement 
technologies across firms, and heterogeneous present capacity to meet standards.  
However this type of a trading mechanism is less amenable to point-source-to-point-
source trading programs characterized by a small number of potential traders in a 
watershed, with discrete and homogeneous abatement technologies across firms, and 
most, if not all, firms not having the present capacity to meet the specified standard.  In 
such settings, managers may be reluctant to not upgrade (and buy permits) or to develop 
excess treatment capacity (and sell permits) because of the relative lack of buyers and 
sellers in a thin market. This potential, in conjunction with our subsequent demonstration 
of cost savings associated with trades that account for discrete fixed costs, leads us to 
argue that a structured bilateral trade system in which profitable trading opportunities are 
identified and implemented with multiyear contracts between firms, would more likely 
approximate cost-effective outcomes than an open-market, price directed system.    3
In addressing these issues, we recognize that neither zonal aggregation nor capital 
cost considerations are novel issues in the pollution trading literature. For example, 
Tietenberg (2006) provides a comprehensive review of studies with various zonal 
configurations, mostly in the context of air quality, while Bennett, Thorpe, and Guse 
(2000) examine the consequences of broadening trading areas with respect to the Long 
Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange program.  Rose-Ackerman (1974), amongst 
others raised concerns about market incentives vis-à-vis substantial, discrete fixed costs 
likely to arise in water quality treatment.  More recently, the US EPA (2003), Boisvert, 
Poe and Sado (2007), Caplan (2008) and Rowles (2008) have discussed the importance of 
the discontinuous or stepwise nature of capital costs in the design and implementation of 
water quality trading programs.  Our contribution is to bring these issues to the forefront, 
in an empirical exploration of factors that could improve the cost-effectiveness of trading 
programs and enhance the viability of water quality trading. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides   
background information on the TMDL and essential attributes of the Upper-Passaic River 
Basin.  We then introduce our conceptual framework, building off of the TRS model.  
Given this framework we employ programming models to explore the effects of zonal 
aggregation and the cost-savings associated with considering fixed costs in a trading 
regime.  The final section concludes with a discussion of the need to further explore long 
term contracting in a structured bilateral trade system.  
 
Essential Features of the Non-tidal Passaic Watershed 
The Non-Tidal Passaic watershed is located primarily in northeastern New Jersey, 
with the uppermost portion extending into New York State.  As depicted in Map 1, this 
803 square mile watershed consists of the Passaic River and its tributaries, draining five 
densely populated counties in New Jersey near the New York City Metropolitan area. 
Approximately one-quarter of New Jersey’s population (i.e., two million people) resides 
within the watershed boundaries. It is a major source of drinking water both inside and 
out of the basin. 
 
As shown in Map 1 the Passaic River initially flows south, then turns and flows in a 
north-easterly direction, and then turns east and finally south before reaching Newark 
Bay. The formal terminus of the Upper Passaic River is Dundee Dam, which separates 
the Upper, Non-Tidal Passaic River from the tidal part of the Passaic River. The Dead 
River joins the Passaic at the point where it first changes direction. At the watershed’s   4
center, the Rockaway River flows into the Whippany River, and in turn, the Whippany 
River flows into the Passaic. The Wanaque River begins in the northern part of the 
watershed, flowing into the Pompton River, which subsequently joins the Passaic. Below 
this confluence, but above the Dundee Dam, the Singac Brook and the Peckman River 
join the Passaic River.  
 
In April 2008, a final TMDL rule was promulgated for this river basin (NJDEP, 
2008), calling for a more than 80% reduction in the total phosphorus concentration 
emissions from 22 Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTPs) in the watershed.  These 
WWTPs are depicted in Map 1 and described in Table 1.  At present the average (flow 
weighted) total phosphorus emissions is estimated to be 2.13 mg/l.   Under the TMDL, 
acceptable long term averages of total phosphorus emissions have been established at 
0.40 mg/l for each of the 22 WWTPs. The primary objective is to meet water quality 
objectives at the two locations with the greatest vulnerability to phosphorus 
contamination.  One of these potential hot spots occurs at the confluence of the Pompton 
and the Passaic, where, depending on demand, a water intake diverts water through a 
pumping station, to the Wanaque Reservoir, and subsequently to consumers in Newark, a 
major city outside the watershed.  This fundamentally alters the hydrology of the 
watershed (Obrupta, Niazi and Kardos).  The second potential hot spot is at Dundee Lake 
and Dam, where the water slows.  The 0.40 mg/L TMDL concentration limits were 
established to meet state water quality requirements on an equitable basis, and any water 
quality trading program must meet these water quality objectives at the two endpoints. 
  
Cost Minimization and Tradable Discharge Permit (TDP) Programs 
A general model to minimize the aggregate abatement costs to achieve a specified 
environmental standard Ej for j zones (j = 1,…,n) can be specified as:  
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where Ci is abatement cost function at source i, 
0
i e is initial effluent at i, ei is effluent after 
treatment at i, and tij is a transfer coefficient from source i to source or receptor zone j   5
that accounts for fate and transport.  Defining
j
i e as the amount measured at site j after 
source i discharges ei, transfer coefficients that reflect decay or attenuation of effluent 
between discharge and the receptor points are: 
(4)  i
j
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This coefficient is necessarily bounded between zero and one, where “zero” indicates that 
the ith source has no effect on the jth receptor (as in the case of being upstream) and 
“one” indicates that the unit of pollution from the ith source does not diminish in any way 
by the time it reaches the jth receptor. An intermediate coefficient of, say, tij = 0.5 would 
indicate that one additional unit of pollution for source i results in one-half a unit of 
pollution at receptor j.   For a region or watershed with I stationary sources of pollutants 
and J receptor points, the fate and transport of water emissions for the I sources can be 
specified by an I by J matrix of (linear) unit transfer coefficients (Montgomery, 1972): 
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Expressing this minimization problem as a Lagrangian Function and solving the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions yields a spatially differentiated equimarginal condition for two 
emission sources (i and k) relative to a single receptor (j): 
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This equimarginal condition is depicted in Figure 1, where total abatement required is 
400 units (the concentration level is converted to the equivalent weight accounting for the 
flow level of the firm) and two transfer adjusted marginal abatement costs are presented.  
Assume that WWTPs i and k are the only two sources of emissions in the watershed and j 
is the only receptor of concern.  For simplicity, we further assume that two WWTPs are 
of similar size and have the same initial level of pollutant (400 units) measured at 
receptor j.  Thus the same TMDLs allocations are assigned to each.  In this case, the cost-
effective equilibrium occurs where the effective emissions of sources i and k are reduced   6
by 300 units and 100 units respectively (300, 100).  Following basic market principles 
and assuming zero transactions costs, the two WWTPs would trade to achieve this least 
cost outcome.  As per Montgomery, any initial allocation of permits that meets the water 
quality objectives would also obtain the cost-effective abatement strategy.   
 
More generally for a setting with multiple sources and receptors, the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for this model imply that a discharger’s marginal abatement cost equals the 
sum of the shadow prices of the total load constraints at affected zones weighted by 
transfer coefficients. If dischargers were charged similar emissions fees, the minimum 
cost solution would also obtain (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
 
Hung and Shaw achieve this cost minimization result with allowance trading under a 
TRS wherein the relative prices of emissions allowances are equated to the transfer 
coefficients. Because water flows downhill, upstream allowance allocations affect 
allocable emissions to downstream sources. Letting j Τ  represent the aggregate tradable 
allowances in a zone, i and k indicate different sources, and Tki (Tik) indentify the number 
of allowances sold by i to k (k to i) the trading constraint can be represented as: 
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Thus allowable emissions are determined by the initial allocation or allowances, plus 
allowances purchased from upstream sources weighted by the relevant trading ratio, 
minus any allowances sold downstream.  Equation 7 reflects the fact that while the seller 
always sells a unit allowance, the buyer receives rights to emit only a portion of a unit, 
equated to the trading ratio defined in Equation 4.  Indexing the most upstream zone as 1 
and the most downstream zone by n, the TRS model is specified as: 
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As with the previous cost minimization model,  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
associated with Equations 8 through 10 imply that a discharger’s marginal abatement cost 
equals the sum of the shadow prices of the total load constraints at affected zones 
weighted by transfer coefficients (Hung and Shaw, 2005; Sado, 2006).  Hung and Shaw   7
demonstrate that this approach will provide the minimum cost of meeting water quality 
objectives at all points of the watershed – in essence stipulating a no degradation outcome 
relative to the original TMDL specified allocation – and prevent free-riding. As will be 
discussed below, this framework can be readily incorporated into a programming model. 
 
Adapting the TRS Model to the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin TMDL 
We extend the TRS model to more closely reflect the reality of phosphorus trading in the 
Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin.  First, Hung and Shaw’s presentation equates sources 
with zones, adopting a one-discharger-one–zone principle.  They note that this concept 
can be generalized to address the range of circumstances between the one-discharger-
one-zone and the other extreme of only one zone within a basin.  The typical 
conceptualization of a multi-zone system treats emissions form various source within a 
zone as having equal effects on water quality (Tietenberg).  Following this framework, 
the trading ratios between sources within a zone would be set to unity. To the extent that 
such ratios comport with the underlying hydrological model, firms can trade emissions in 
a TRS with no degradation relative to the initial TMDL allocation at all points in the 
watershed and obtain this result at least cost. 
 
With respect to the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin TMDL, a no-degradation 
requirement at all points in the watershed is overly restrictive.  An extensive water 
quality simulation study (Omni Environmental, 2007) indicates that any possible range of 
water quality trading outcomes that meet the water quality objective at the two designated 
endpoints will also lead to no excessive loading in other areas of the watershed because 
of other factors that mitigate the impact of phosphorus (viz. flow, shad cover and 
turbidity).  Based on these modeling results, a Management Area approach has been 
adopted for the TMDL implementation: a Management Area (MA)  
 
“is delineated so that its outlet represents the only hot spot concern in that 
management area.  Because there are no hot-spot concerns in addition to the 
management area outlet, bidirectional trades (i.e. , seller can be upstream or 
downstream of the buyer) are allowed within the same management area.  Trades 
are subject to a trading ratio in order to equalize the load treated and account for 
difference in attenuation for the load from each WWTP relative to the 
management area outlet”  (Obrupta, Niazi and Kardos, p. 952 ) 
   8
Three MAs are identified in the TMDL:  the Upper Passaic MA consisting of WWTPs 
D1-D3, P1-P8, W1-W4, and R1 with associated endpoint at the confluence of the Passaic 
and Pompton rivers; the Pompton MA, WQ, T1 and T2, with endpoint at the confluence 
of the Passaic and Pompton Rivers; and the Lower Passaic MA, P9-P11, with endpoint at 
the Dundee Lake and Dam.  Accounting for a number of factors, including seasonal 
variations in flows, the set of allowable trades is depicted in the table below.  
 
        Buyer 
 
Seller 
Upper Passaic MA
(D1-D3, P1-P8, 
W1-W4, R1) 
Pompton MA 
(WQ,T1,T2) 
Lower Passaic MA
(P9-P11) 
 
 Upper Passaic MA  Yes  No  Yes 
 Pompton MA  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Lower Passaic MA  No  No  Yes 
 
That is, the following trades are allowed: 1) internal – upstream and downstream trades 
within a management area; 2) downstream trades from the Upper Passaic and Pompton 
MAs to the Lower Passaic MA; and 3) cross tributary trades from the Pompton MA to the 
Passaic MA but not vice versa.  As is discussed below, this management area approach 
can be accommodated in the Hung and Shaw TRS model by manipulating a matrix of 
trading ratios.  The development of these MAs is fully detailed in Obrupta et al. 
  
Our second modification to the Hung and Shaw TRS model is to account for discrete 
fixed costs associated with upgrading to enable treating effluent to a lower concentration 
level.  In setting up their model, Hung and Shaw assume that the abatement cost function 
) ( e e C
o
i i − is “increasing and strictly convex”, consistent with the marginal cost approach 
utilized by Montgomery (“convex and twice differentiable), Tietenberg (“continuous cost 
function”) and others.  While marginal abatement cost is a useful theoretical construct, 
actual pollution abatement decisions often do not occur at the margin.  Adding additional 
chemicals or other small changes allow additional abatement control in some instances, 
but, given initial capital configurations, there can be limits to such opportunities. 
 
“Generally, pollution controls are feasible to implement in relatively large 
installments that [can] reduce multiple units of pollutants.  Point sources in   9
particular tend to purchase additional loading reduction capability in large 
increments.  For example a wastewater treatment plant upgrade or plant expansion 
may be designed to treat millions of gallons a day”  (US EPA, 1996, p. 3-2). 
 
The optimal allocation of capital investments can be described by considering the 
adjusted capital investment cost curves for emission abatement for two firms presented in 
Figure 2. For comparison purposes, we use the same two firms, i and j, as in the previous 
discussion, assuming again that the initial TMDL allocation corresponds to each source 
abating the equivalent of 200 units at receptor j. Suppose that with current capital levels 
neither WWTP can independently achieve the effective 400 unit reduction. Each firm has 
two capital investment options: firm i can choose a low level of capital spending on its 
abatement facility, which can only achieve emission levels as low as 300 units. If i wants 
to abate beyond this level, it would have to incur high level capital spending to upgrade 
its facility. Similarly, firm j can choose a low level capital spending and high emission 
levels (more than 310 units), or high level capital spending and emission levels below 
310 units.  Again assuming that the initial TMDL allocation stipulates that each WWTP 
reduce effective emissions to 200 units at point j, there are incentives for trade up to the 
point where source j achieves an effluent level higher than 310 units by buying 
allowances from firm i, and discharger j’s effluent level of  less than 90 units allows j to 
supply allowances to i. As such, firm j avoids a high level of capital spending.  In other 
words, only one firm needs to upgrade and the other can avoid upgrading through trade. 
If no trade had been possible, each discharger would have abated 200 units; they both 
would have to incur high level capital costs to upgrade each of their abatement facilities.   
 
To this point, we have illustrated the potential cost-savings from O&M and capital 
costs separately. However, the optimal abatement allocation should minimize the firms’ 
total abatement cost, namely, the combination of both “continuous” variable cost (O&M 
costs) and the discrete capital investment cost.  Given appropriate numerical assumptions, 
the savings from capital costs can more than offset the additional O&M costs of moving 
beyond the equimarginal position of (300,100) to a total-cost-minimizing outcome (310, 
90). This result is depicted in Figure 3, which suggests that there may be a range of 
possible allowance prices due to the gap between adjusted marginal abatement costs.  The 
shaded area represents the increase in O&M costs relative to the equimarginal optimum. 
 
While our results depict a setting in which one firm abates to the maximum level of 
abatement possible for a fixed level of investment, the relationship between fixed and   10
O&M costs may be such that the  there is an interior sollution corresponding to the 
aforementioned trading-ratio-adjusted equimarginal principle in Equation 6.   Further, the 
depictions in Figures 1 and 3 rely on a single marginal abatement cost curve, independent 
of the level of fixed investment, which also may not hold. 
 
The Data and the Empirical Specification 
There are three essential components of the data for estimating total abatement costs and 
trade patterns: 1) data on the initial effluent allowed for each WWTP under the TMDL; 2) 
the transfer coefficients or trading ratios between each plant for which trading is possible; 
and 3) data on O&M and capital costs of phosphorus abatement for each WWTP. 
The Environmental Capacity and the TMDLs 
For the Passaic Watershed, effluent load capacities are defined in terms of TMDLs which 
account for background and natural levels of pollutant and the transfer adjusted inflows 
from upstream sources.  The corresponding allowable firm (or zonal) discharges are 
specified under each discharger’s National or State Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permits, with the TMDL set so that the long term average emissions 
from each WWTP not exceed 0.40 mg/l total phosphorus (NJDEP 2008). These policy 
tools are consistent with Hung and Shaw’s zonal load caps. As depicted in Table 1, the 
current total phosphorus (TP) effluent levels vary substantially among plants, with only 
three WWTPs presently capable of meeting the 0.40 mg/l standard.  The average existing 
TP concentration is 2.13 mg/l for plants which currently do not remove any phosphorus, 
well above the TMDL’s target effluent level of 0.40 mg/l. 
The Trading Ratios 
The transfer coefficients and trading ratios are based on several scientific factors such as 
the rate of inflow-outflow of pollutants, bio-physical conditions, and the geography of the 
designated areas. The transfer coefficients were derived by the distance between the 
outlet of the point source and the target location, the settling and uptake rates of 
orthophosphate and organic phosphorus occurring in the flow path, and the ratio of 
orthophosphate and organic phosphorus discharged from the source (Najarian Associates 
2005).   Table 2 presents the trading ratio matrix corresponding to Hung and Shaw’s 
model.  Note that each of non-zero ratios is close to unity, reflecting the relatively close 
proximity of WWTPs in the watershed and limited attenuation. Later we manipulate this 
data to accommodate the management area approach. 
Estimating the Costs of Phosphorus Abatement 
Since most WWTPs in the watershed currently have little or no present capacity to   11
remove phosphorus, we estimate consistent phosphorus removal cost functions for both 
yearly O&M and capital costs from data on actual costs of 104 treatment plants located in 
the Chesapeake Bay watershed (NRTCTF 2002). Given geographic proximity and other 
similarities between the Chesapeake Bay and Passaic watersheds, the data are nearly 
ideal for our purposes.  For the 104 waste water treatment plants in the Chesapeake Bay 
study, we have data on daily flow and annual O&M cost for several effluent 
concentrations (e.g. 2mg/l; 1mg/l; 0.5mg/l; and 0.1mg/l). Adopting a flexible functional 
form (Boisvert 1982; Vinod 1972) the following cost function was estimated using OLS: 
(11)  F C F C OM ln ln 043 . 0 ln 785 . 0 ln 997 . 0 870 . 9 ln ln
) 029 . 0 ( ) 048 . 0 ( ) 032 . 0 ( ) 052 . 0 (
+ + − =            
where OM is the annual operation and maintenance costs; C is final phosphorus 
concentration, in mg/l; F is daily flow in million gallons per day; and the  numbers in 
parentheses are estimated standard errors.  As discussed in Sado and Sado, Boisvert and 
Poe (2009) all coefficients have expected signs.  Importantly, treatment costs are 
inversely related to concentration levels and treatment costs rise with flow levels. 
Using a similar method, the capital investment cost function is specified as: 
(12)  F C F C CC ln ln 164 . 0 ln 302 . 0 ln 995 . 0 878 . 11 ln ln
) 004 . 0 ( ) 006 . 0 ( ) 004 . 0 ( ) 006 . 0 (
− + − =        
where CC is capital investment cost and the numbers in parentheses are estimated 
standard errors. Again, the estimated parameters conform to a priori expectations  
 
The data from the Chesapeake Bay study are for inexpensive chemical removal of 
phosphorus, and we assume this technology is adopted by the Passaic WWTPs with no 
current capacity to treat phosphorus. For the three plants (W1, W2 and R1) that operate 
biological phosphorus removal processes, we adjust the coefficients to reflect this 
difference in technology, These modifications, based on simulation analyses by the 
University of Georgia for eight designs of wastewater treatment facilities (Jiang, et al. 
2005), shift the O&M cost function upward to reflect the generally higher cost of the 
biological removal process; the cost elasticity with respect to concentration declines (see 
Sado and Sado, Boisvert and Poe). 
  
The Phosphorus Emissions Trading Model for the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin 
Hung and Shaw’s objective function is based on the costs of removing specific amounts 
of phosphorus. This is equivalent to minimizing the combined costs across all plants of 
discharging phosphorus where there is an upper TMDL-specified limit on the amount 
each plant can discharge without trade. We use average flow from the prior three years as   12
the flow factor in the model.  Consistent with the TMDL, the maximum permitted 
concentration from each WWTP is 0.40 mg/l (NJDEP 2008).  For the three WWTPs that 
already exceed this standard, their TMDL allocations correspond to their current levels of 
treatment.  After transforming the estimated functions presented in Equations 11 and 12 
to convert concentrations in mg/l into pounds of phosphorus, the model is: 
(13)  ∑ ∑ = =
i i i i i i
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The coefficients (Table 7) for these transformed cost functions, OMi (ei), also embody the 
differences in daily flows across the WWTPs, and O&M costs decline as the pounds of 
phosphorus emissions increase and flow decreases. Thus, if the constraint on phosphorus 
emissions embodied in Equation 14 were not in the model, the minimum cost solution 
would be zero, and no phosphorus would be removed. With this constraint, costs are 
minimized, subject to emissions by each plant being less than the TMDL, plus the trade-
ratio weighted number of allowances bought, less the number of allowances sold. The 
model is formulated empirically and solved within GAMS (Brooke, et al. 1988). 
 
The starting point for the empirical analysis also assumes current treatment capacities. 
While Equation 12 suggests that the estimated capital cost functions are continuous in 
both concentration and flow capacity, plants would likely have to make discrete  
investments to accommodate treating to one of a small number of final concentration 
levels. These upgrades would be “lumpy”, and in the portion of the analysis in which 
investment levels and annualized capital costs are accounted for, we allow for only five 
discrete concentrations: a) current level > target concentration ≥ 1.0mg/l; b) 1mg/l > 
target concentration ≥ 0.5mg/l; c) 0.5mg/l > target concentration ≥ 0.25mg/l, d) 0.2 mg/l 
> target concentration ≥ 0.10mg/l, and e) 0.10mg/l > target concentration (e.g. Figure 4). 
While these capital costs rise in discrete steps associated with increasingly stringent 
concentration levels, the average costs of treatment falls with flow for a given 
concentration level.  Ceteris paribus this suggests that total capital costs could be saved 
by shifting abatement responsibilities from small to large WWTPs.  Although informed 
by engineers, these discrete capital cost thresholds are arbitrary.  Ideally, we would have   13
estimated distinct O&M cost curves for each level of capital investment, but our data was 
not rich enough for such an analysis. 
 
Implementation and Empirical Results 
In our discussion of comparative results across treatments we will focus on the watershed 
cost savings and the direction of trades under different circumstances.  While cost savings 
for individual firms, relative O&M versus capital costs and other metrics are of interest, 
they divert from the major focus of this paper. 
 
The Baseline Case: Treatment Costs When No Trade is Allowed 
The appropriate base situation for evaluating cost-savings associated with allowance 
trading is the no-trade situation in which each WWTP independently meets its NPDES 
defined concentration standard associated with the TMDL.  We assume phosphorus is 
removed by chemical treatment, except for the three plants that already use biological 
treatment. In treating to the minimum of 0.40 mg/l or current concentration, the total 
annual costs of phosphorus removal are $3.16 million/year. Annualized capital costs 
account for 39% of total phosphorus removal costs.   This provides the baseline of 
comparison for evaluating subsequent trading regimes.  
 
Trading Case 1: Hung and Shaw TRS System, O&M Cost Only 
This scenario corresponds to the Hung and Shaw TRS: the only trades allowed are those 
with non-zero trading ratios as defined in Equation 4 and the corresponding τ matrix in 
Table 3; no degradation is allowed at any point in the watershed relative to the original 
TMDL; and only O&M costs are accounted for in determining whether individual 
WWTPs buy, sell, or do not trade allowances.  We assume that each WWTP invests in 
the capacity to independently meet its NPDES permit requirements. Empty cells in Table 
3 indicate that trades are not allowed between that seller and buyer (i.e., tik = 0). 
 
Because tik = 0 for k < i, allowances can only be sold downstream in the TRS.  The 
realization of such trades will thus only occur if upstream WWTPs have lower abatement 
costs than downstream WWTPs after appropriate adjustments for the transfer coefficient.  
That is, adapting Equation 6, trades will only occur if MC(ei
k ) < MC(ek) for k > i.  As 
would be expected with downstream trading all trades between the eight buyers and eight 
sellers are above the main diagonal in Table 4. Most of these trades are between 
immediately adjacent WWTPs.   Total costs under this program fall a nominal 0.69%   14
relative to the baseline case, with savings being attributed to reduced O&M costs.  This 
low level of savings can be attributed to the relative homogeneity of waste water 
treatment costs. Moreover, there are no capital cost savings because each firm is assume 
to invest in the capacity to independently meet the no-trade TMDL standard.  
 
Trading Case 2:  Three Management Areas, Two Endpoints, O&M Cost Only 
The modeling of the three management areas, two endpoints approach requires a 
restructuring of the matrix τ.  The τ matrix used up to this point accounts for direct 
physical linkages between sources and receptors. The present scenario instead requires a 
trading-ratio matrix to be developed that defines the trading ratios in terms of the relative 
effects of emissions from each source on the nearest common endpoint.  For WWTPs in 
the same MA, the ratio of the source to endpoint transfer coefficients serves as the 
appropriate trading ratio.  In the Pompton MA, for example, all trading ratios are defined 
relative to the source emission impacts on water quality at the confluence of the Pompton 
and Passaic Rivers.   Between MAs the closest common endpoint is used: for the 
Pompton and Upper Passaic MAs the relevant endpoint is the confluence of the Pompton 
and Passaic Rivers; for Upstream (Pompton and Upper Passaic) and Downstream (Lower 
Passaic) MAs the common endpoint is the Dundee Lake and Dam.  The resultant trading 
ratio matrix is provided in Table 4, which we shall designate as τ
MA.  Note that trading 
ratios no longer have the upper bound of one, indicating that sources are allowed to sell 
allowances to firms hydrologically more distant from the relevant endpoint.   
 
The trading patterns for this scenario are depicted in Table 6.  As in Trading Case 1, 
all firms are assumed to have the capacity to treat to the 0.40 mg/l level, and hence the 
only cost savings are though O&M cost reductions.  As demonstrated, the pattern of 
trades changes dramatically.  Now only four WWTPs (P8, W4, WQ and P9) act as 
sellers, and 17 WWTPs buy permits.  Interestingly, most of these trades occur with 
sellers located hydrologically downstream as indicated by the predominance of trading 
entries below the main diagonal.  Despite this additional trading activity, the cost savings 
remain a relatively meager 1.33% relative to the baseline no-trade scenario.   
 
Trading Case 3: Hung and Shaw TRS System, O&M and Capital Cost  
In this scenario, τ once again serves as the relevant trading ratio.  In contrast with Case 1 
trades are based on total cost savings.  Conceptually, such savings could be modeled two 
ways.  One option would be to employ a mixed integer programming model to account 
for the discrete capital costs as well as the possibility of an interior solution for the   15
continuous O&M costs.  An alternative is to use a sequential decision heuristic that 
restricts capital investments for individual firms based on flow level, location, and 
concentration levels relative to a discrete, capital-cost threshold.   We have pursued both 
approaches, and they provide the exact same trade patterns and costs savings.  Here we 
describe the method of implementing the sequential decision heuristic.  
 
Our starting point for this analysis is Case 1.  Recall, that in our previous analysis 
WWTPs were assumed to invest in enough capacity to meet their specified 0.40 mg/l 
concentration  (i.e. they incur capital costs associated with the 0.50 mg/l to 0.25 mg/l 
capital cost step). The exception is WQ, which already is treating to 0.16 mg/l.  We allow 
O&M marginal-cost trading from this initial allocation. One outcome is that a few 
selected firms purchase enough allowances to be able to emit more than 0.50 mg/l.  If, a 
priori, these firms could be assured access to permits, monies could have been saved by 
not requiring these WWTPs to upgrade to the 0.50 mg/l to 0.25 mg/l capital step.  In our 
modeling framework this was achieved by adding the following additional restriction to 
the model described by Equations 13-16. 
 
(17) ) / 50 . 0 ( l mg e e i i ≤  
 
In the above equation ei(0.50 mg/l) is the emissions level for firm i associated with 
achieving a 0.50 mg/l concentration.  Given these restrictions, the capital costs savings 
associated with not upgrading to the 0.50 mg/l to 0.25 mg/l treatment range are imputed.   
 
Moving beyond these selected firms, we sequentially restrict the concentration levels 
of other WWTPs based on the level of concentration emerging from O&M trading, the 
WWTP’s flow level, and the location of the WWTP relative to larger (presumably lower 
cost) trading partners. WWTPs with Case1-O&M-based concentrations nearing 0.50 
mg/l, WWTPs more distant from a relevant endpoint, and smaller WWTPs were selected 
for sequentially implementing the Equation 17 restrictions. The second row of Table 7 
indicates the order that the restrictions were placed.  For example, W3 was the first 
WWTP for which emissions were restricted.  In all, nine concentration restrictions were 
imposed, with overall O&M and capital cost savings estimated to be 6.79% relative to the 
no-trade baseline. 
 
Trading Case 4: Three management areas, Two Endpoints, O&M and Capital Costs   16
Case 2 was adapted using the same methods used in Case 3.  Trading patterns are 
presented in Table 8 and the savings associated with the sequential restrictions on 
concentration levels depicted in Figure 5.  The following pattern of trade is observed: 
large firms (taking advantage of economies of scale in capital treatment costs) that are 
well positioned (in terms of trading ratios relative to ambient measurement points) 
become sellers, avoiding the need for higher average cost capital investments of smaller, 
typically upstream WWTPs. Overall savings are 18.26% relative to the no-trade baseline. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The above results suggest that moderate cost savings from trading phosphorus allowances 
can be achieved through a Management Area approach and that substantial gains are 
possible if trades can effectuate the efficient allocation of fixed cost investments across 
WWTPs.  The former issue is primarily driven by the hydrology of a particular watershed 
and whether managing water quality to avoid a selected number of hot spots is deemed 
appropriate.  We focus on the later issue of how to organize a cost-effective market 
exchange and further narrow our attention to the previously described typical watershed: 
one characterized by a small number of potential traders, with discrete and homogeneous 
abatement technologies across firms, and most, if not all, firms not having the present 
capacity to meet the specified standard.   
 
In large, fluid pollution permit markets with many traders, such as the nation-wide 
U.S. acid rain program, the issue of fixed costs is expected to have little practical 
significance.  This is because a discharger’s decision to upgrade its facility is likely to 
have no noticeable effect on the market supply or demand for permits.  In smaller 
markets with few trading partners, however, firms that opt not to upgrade their systems 
fully are not guaranteed that a supply of permits will be available as a substitute at any 
price.  In a similar manner, firms that choose to upgrade, base their decision, in part, on 
the presupposition that demand exists for their unused allowances.  In such settings a 
likely outcome, consistent with Cases 1 and 3 explored here, is that all WWTPs will 
upgrade so as to have the capacity to independently meet their NPDES permit 
requirement.  Having made this capital investment WWTPs will trade allowances based 
on comparing their marginal O&M costs to the prevailing market price.   Our case study 
suggests that the gains from such trading are nominal, ranging from 0.69% to 1.33% of 
total costs in the no-trade baseline.  Given positive transactions costs, it is unlikely that a 
vibrant trading market would result in such circumstances.  These results and conjectures 
are consistent the disappointing level of water quality trading observed to date.   17
 
However, if firms are able to account for discrete fixed costs, our results suggest that 
the costs savings can increase dramatically.  In our case study cost savings exceed 18% of 
the of total costs in the no-trade baseline.    The policy issue is, how can this cost-
effective allocation be achieved? 
 
One approach would be to develop a structured bilateral trading program.  The gains 
from bilateral trading opportunities have long been recognized in settings where 
transactions costs associated with open-market trading are high relative to the gains from 
trade (Woodward, Kaiser and Wicks, 2002).  A simple example of the potential of 
bilateral transactions in the face of discrete fixed investments is found in is found in 
Breetz et al.’s discussion of the trading program in Bear Creek, CO in which each year a 
large discharger (Evergreen Metro) reduces phosphorus release in a trade of 40-80 
pounds per year so that a smaller discharger (Forest Hills) does not have to undergo a 
costly upgrade to its facilities: 
 
“It is estimated that Forest Hills saves over $1.2 million, the cost of an expensive 
system replacement that would be necessary to meet their allocation without a 
trade… In exchange for Evergreen Metro reducing their discharge, Forest Hills 
pays an undisclosed amount of money that has been estimated to be around 
$5,000 per year” (p. 28) 
 
Our results suggest that approaching a cost-effective reallocation of abatement 
responsibilities may require a more structured approach than one-on-one negotiations.  
This is because large, well located WWTPs can engender substantial watershed-wide 
costs savings by upgrading and accepting treatment responsibilities for several smaller 
WWTPs simultaneously.  For example, in our case study a limited number of larger firms 
upgrade, allowing smaller firms to avoid such investments: W4 is able to treat for D1-D3, 
P1, P2, P4, P7, W1-W3 and R1, allowing  each of these WWTPs to avoid having to 
invest in costly capital. Moreover, given that these savings are likely to persist over a 
number of years, multi-year contracting may be a necessity.  Facilitating such contracts, 
in which capital cost savings by one firm trading with another is dependent upon the 
concurrent contracting decisions by a number of other firms, may necessitate an 
organized structure of contracting between one WWTP, say W4, and a number of buyers.  18
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Map 1: Upper Passaic River Basin and WWTPs. 
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Figure 1.  Simple Geometry of Marginal Cost Trading 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Simple Geometry of Fixed Costs Trading 
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Figure 2.  Simple Geometry of Total  Cost Trading 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of Step Capital Cost Function for Largest 
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WWTP Restriction  % Total Cost 
Saving
O&M Trading  1.33
W1 > 0.50 mg/L     4.33
P7 > 0.50 mg/L     5.60
P1 > 0.50 mg/L 6.48
P6 > 0.50 mg/L 7.31
W3 > 0.50 mg/L  8.51
D1 > 0.50 mg/L 9.62
W2  > 0.50 mg/L         11.39
P3 > 0.50 mg/L         12.43
P5 > 0.50 mg/L         13.02
P2 > 0.50 mg/L         13.55
R1 > 0.50 mg/L         14.93
P4 > 0.50 mg/L         15.24
D2 > 0.50 mg/L         15.58
D3 > 0.50 mg/L         16.06
P11 > 0.50 mg/L         17.04
P10        > 0.50 mg/L         18.26 
Table 1. Data for Municipal Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP) 
     Phosphorus 
Map Code 
for WWTP  River  Flow 
(MGD)    Load 
(lbs/Y) 
Concentration 
(mg/l) 
TMDL 
0.4mg/l
 
(lbs/year)
# 
D1 Dead  1.76  16,780 3.13  2,144 
D2 Dead  0.15  845 1.85  183 
D3 Dead  0.31  1,804 1.91  378 
P1 Passaic 1.00  8,011 2.63  1,218 
P2 Passaic 0.36  1,831 1.67  439 
P3
* Passaic  1.57  2,869 0.60  1,913 
P4 Passaic 0.12  559 1.53  146 
P5 Passaic 2.41  24,079 3.28  2,936 
P6 Passaic 0.90  4,057 1.48  1,097 
P7 Passaic 2.61  20,909 2.63  3,180 
P8 Passaic 3.75  18,505 1.62  4,569 
W1
* Whippany  1.90  4,862 0.84  2,315 
W2
* Whippany  3.03  5,186 0.56  3,704 
W3 Whippany  2.03  18,505 2.83  2,473 
W4 Whippany  12.58  114,192 2.98  15,327 
R1
* Rockaway  8.81  39,180 1.46  10,734 
WQ
* Wanaque  1.00 487 0.16 1,218 
T1
* Pompton 0.86  838 0.32 1,048 
T2 Pompton  5.33  34,744 2.14  6,494 
P9  Preakness 
Brook  7.47  51,652 2.27  9,602 
P10 Passaic  2.46  23,004 3.07  2,997 
P11 Passaic  1.26  8,636 2.25  1,535 
Total       401,535 2.13
**  75,650 
Notes:
 #This is the TMDL adopted on April 24, 2008; 
* Plants that currently  
have some capacity to remove phosphorus; 
**Average weighted by flow. 
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Table 2. The Parameters for the Transformed O&M Cost Functions for the 22 Plants 
WWTP  φ   ψ  WWTP  φ   ψ 
D1 19.793  -1.151  W1  18.195  -0.879 
D2 15.675  -1.257  W2  18.788  -0.859 
D3 16.943  -1.225  W3  20.015  -1.145 
P1 18.893  -1.175  W4  22.707  -1.066 
P2 17.198  -1.219  R1  20.075  -0.813 
P3 19.613  -1.156  WQ  19.002  -1.172 
P4 15.276  -1.266  T1  18.649  -1.181 
P5 20.281  -1.137  T2  21.476  -1.103 
P6 18.723  -1.180  P9  21.967  -1.089 
P7 20.403  -1.134  P10  20.312  -1.136 
P8 20.953  -1.118  P11  19.264  -1.165 
Note: The cost functions are specified in equation (25).    
  
 
   27
Table 3: Trading Ratios (τ) for TRS models 
    D1  D2  D3  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8  W1 W2 W3 R1 W4 WQ T1  T2  P9 P10 P11
D1  1 1 1  0.97  0.97  0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93                                 
D2      1  1 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93                                 
D3        1  0.97  0.97  0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93                                 
P1           1  1  1 1 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96                                 
P2              1  1 1 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96                                 
P3                 1 1 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96                                 
P4                    1 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96                                 
P5                       1 1 1 1                                 
P6                          1 1 1                                 
P7                             1 1                                 
P8                                1                                 
W1                                   1 1 1     1                  
W2                                      1 1     1                  
W3                                         1     1                  
R1                                            1                      
W4                                               1                  
WQ                                                  1 1 0.99         
T1                                                     1 0.99         
T2                                                        1         
P9                                                           1      
P10                                                              1 1
P11                                                                 1
The WWTP in the row represents the seller and the WWTP in the column represents the buyer of allowances.   28 
Table 4: Trading Ratios (τ
MA) for Three MA models 
    D1 D2 D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 W1 W2 W3 R1 W4  WQ T1 T2  P9 P10  P11 
D1  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.20 1.04           0.63 0.64 0.64
D2  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.20 1.04           0.63 0.64 0.64
D3  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.20 1.04           0.63 0.64 0.64
P1  1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.24 1.08           0.65 0.66 0.66
P2  1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.24 1.08           0.65 0.66 0.66
P3  1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.24 1.08           0.65 0.66 0.66
P4  1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.24 1.08           0.65 0.66 0.66
P5  1.08 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.29 1.13           0.68 0.69 0.69
P6  1.08 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.29 1.13           0.68 0.69 0.69
P7  1.08 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.29 1.13           0.68 0.69 0.69
P8  1.08 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.29 1.13           0.68 0.69 0.69
W1  0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.00           0.60 0.61 0.61
W2  0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.00           0.60 0.61 0.61
W3  0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.00           0.60 0.61 0.61
R1  0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.00 0.87           0.52 0.54 0.54
W4  0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.00           0.60 0.61 0.61
WQ  0.70 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.51 0.52 0.52
T1  0.70 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.51 0.52 0.52
T2  0.70 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.67 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.52 0.53 0.52
P9                                                           1.00 0.90 0.90
P10                                                           1.11 1.00 1.00
P11                                                           1.11 1.00 1.00
The WWTP in the row represents the seller and the WWTP in the column represents the buyer of allowances.   29 
 
Table 5: Lbs of Allowances Traded ,Trading Case 1 - Hung and Shaw TRS System, Operating and Maintenance Cost Only 
    D1 D2  D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5  P6  P7  P8 W1 W2 W3 R1 W4 WQ T1  T2  P9 P10 P11 
D1     50.9  63.2     39.9                                                    
D2                                                                   
D3                                                                   
P1              17.3                                                    
P2                                                                   
P3                    51.7                                             
P4                                                                   
P5                          108.9                                       
P6                                                                   
P7                                                                   
P8                                                                   
W1                                                                   
W2                                         22.7                         
W3                                                                   
R1                                                                   
W4                                                                   
WQ                                                        731.4         
T1                                                        209.8         
T2                                                                   
P9                                                                   
P10                                                                 93.3
P11                                                                   
The WWTP in the row represents the seller and the WWTP in the column represents the buyer of allowances. 
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Table 6: Lbs of Allowances Traded ,Trading Case 2 - Three Management Areas, Two Endpoints, Operating and Maintenance Cost Only 
    D1 D2  D3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5  P6  P7  P8  W1  W2  W3  R1 W4 WQ T1  T2  P9  P10  P11 
D1                                                                   
D2                                                                   
D3                                                                   
P1                                                                   
P2                                                                   
P3                                                                   
P4                                                                   
P5                                                                   
P6                                                                   
P7                                                                   
P8        71.3     78.5                            7.8                     
W1                                                                   
W2                                                                   
W3                                                                   
R1                                                                   
W4  242.5 98.1 71.9 230.4 72.4 221.2 84.0             451.7  403.4 271.4                        
WQ                       156.8 269.8 122.6                         182.2         
T1                                                        209.8         
T2                                                                   
P9                                                              182.7  262.2 
P10                                                                   
P11                                                                   
The WWTP in the row represents the seller and the WWTP in the column represents the buyer of allowances.   31 
Table 7: Lbs of Allowances Traded, TRS (downstream trades only), Trades Based on O&M and Capital Costs. 
    D1  D2 D3  P1  P2 P3  P4  P5 P6 P7 P8  W1 W2  W3  R1 W4 WQ T1  T2  P9 P10  P11 
Order in restrictions 
) / 50 . 0 ( l mg e e i i ≤  
  6 7 8  9   3   4  5     1           2 
D1     45.7  94.5 315.9 113.7                                                   
D2                                                                   
D3                                                                   
P1                                                                   
P2                                                                   
P3                    36.6    209.9                                       
P4                                                                   
P5                          72.4    497.5                                  
P6                                                                   
P7                                645.9                                  
P8                                                                   
W1                                         138.2                        
W2                                         480.8                        
W3                                                                   
R1                                                                   
W4                                                                   
WQ                                                        731.4         
T1                                                        209.8         
T2                                                                   
P9                                                                   
P10                                                                 384.2 
P11                                                                   
The WWTP in the row represents the seller and the WWTP in the column represents the buyer of allowances. 
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Table 7: Lbs of Allowances Traded, Three Management Areas, Trades Based on O&M and Capital Costs. 
    D1  D2  D3  P1 P2 P3  P4  P5 P6 P7  P8  W1  W2  W3  R1  W4 WQ T1 T2 P9  P10  P11 
Order in restrictions 
) / 50 . 0 ( l mg e e i i ≤  
6  13  14  3  10  8  12  9 4 2    1 7 5 11           16  15 
D1                                                                   
D2                                                                   
D3                                                                   
P1                                                                   
P2                                                                   
P3                                                                   
P4                                                                   
P5                                                                   
P6                                                                   
P7                                                                   
P8  491.4              460.6          181.5                                    
W1                                                                   
W2                                                                   
W3                                                                   
R1                                                                   
W4  7.8 47.8 98.8 330.1 118.8     39.6       11.8    579.3  926.9 619.0 2347.2                     
WQ                       249.1 296.8 185.5                                    
T1                       65.4 66.3 78.1                                    
T2                       657.8    535.4                                    
P9                                                              834.7  427.5 
P10                                                                   
P11                                                                   
The WWTP in the row represents the seller and the WWTP in the column represents the buyer of allowances. 
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